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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Jenna Foran, Employee, Appellant, 
v. 
Murphy USA, Employer, and Liberty Insurance 
Corporation, Carrier, Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001606 
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission 
Opinion No. 5491 

Heard February 8, 2017 – Filed June 14, 2017 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 
C. Scott Masel, of Newby Sartip Masel & Casper, LLC, 
of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. 
Anne Veatch Noonan, of Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, 
P.A., of Mount Pleasant, and John Gabriel Coggiola, of 
Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia, both 
for Respondents. 
MCDONALD, J.:  This is a workers' compensation case arising from injuries 
Jenna Foran suffered while stocking cigarettes at a convenience store.  Foran 
appeals the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of 
compensation, arguing the Commission erred in finding her injury was an
idiopathic fall not compensable as an "injury by accident arising out of and in the 
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course of [her] employment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (2015).  We reverse 
and remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Foran began working as a cashier for Murphy Oil in December 2013.  She alleges 
that on April 29, 2014, she stood up after kneeling down to stock cigarettes and 
misstepped on the edge of a floor mat behind the cash register.  Foran claims her 
left ankle rolled on the uneven surface, causing her to suffer torn ligaments and 
requiring surgery. 
At a hearing before the single commissioner, Respondents argued Foran suffered 
an idiopathic injury due to a pre-existing instability of her left ankle.  Foran 
admitted she had surgery on her left ankle in 20041 but claimed that after the 
surgery, her left ankle healed and she had no physical limitations.  She testified 
that following her surgery, she worked as a cashier and lifeguard and also played 
volleyball and softball.  Foran denied complaining about left ankle pain prior to her 
injury and recalled describing the injury to her supervisor, who stated she would 
need to inform the store manager, Randolph Stokes Rogers.  Rogers testified that 
before her injury, Foran walked with a noticeable limp and complained multiple 
times about having a "bad ankle."  However, he admitted no physical limitations 
precluded Foran from performing any of her job duties.  Rogers claimed he did not 
hear about a mat causing Foran's injury until a few weeks before trial and said 
Foran told him "she was stocking cigarettes and when she went to get up her ankle 
kind of gave way." 
Medical records from the day of Foran's injury documented that it occurred "when 
she stood up and may have caught on a mat twisting her left ankle—since then it is 
painful to bear weight on it."  Dr. John Daly, at Doctors Care, noted Foran's x-rays 
indicated "[t]here may have been prior internal fixation, [but] no acute fracture 
[was] evident."  After the Murphy Oil injury, Foran required work restrictions "due 
to an acute injury." 
The notes of Dr. Ross Taylor at Coastal Orthopedics reflect Foran "admit[ted] to 
having complete loss of sensation distal to the mid cap area since her previous 
surgery" and "this [was] not related to her most recent injury."  Dr. Taylor 
1 Medical records reflect Foran had surgery on her left ankle in December 2005.   
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concluded Foran's "left ankle [was] grossly unstable and the previous repair 
ruptured at the time of her most recent injury in all likelihood."  Dr. Taylor's report 
further indicated Foran's pain "began when she was at work after slipping and 
falling." 
After reviewing the store surveillance video from the time of her injury and 
inspecting the mat, the single commissioner determined Foran's injury was 
idiopathic and not caused or aggravated by her work or any special risk posed by 
her employment.  The single commissioner concluded the video showed Foran 
standing at the register with both feet forward when her left ankle rolled and noted 
(1) Foran's description of the accident differed from what the video depicted; (2) 
Rogers testified Foran never told him the mat caused her fall and he only learned 
this two weeks before the hearing date; (3) Rogers testified Foran walked with a 
"significant and noticeable limp on the left side prior to April 29, 2014"; and (4) a 
medical report indicated Foran reported her left ankle pain began after she slipped 
and fell but did not describe slipping on a mat.   
The Appellate Panel affirmed the single commissioner's order based on Foran's 
chronic left ankle instability, the surveillance video, Foran's testimony, and
Rogers's testimony.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
"[W]orkers' compensation [statutes are] to be liberally construed in favor of 
coverage in order to serve the beneficent purpose of the [Workers' Compensation] 
Act; only exceptions and restrictions on coverage are to be strictly construed."  
James v. Anne's Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 198, 701 S.E.2d 730, 735 (2010).  "An 
appellate court can reverse or modify the [Appellate Panel]'s decision if it is 
affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence in the whole record."  Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 
S.C. 534, 540, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010).  "Substantial evidence is 'not a mere 
scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but 
is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable 
minds to reach the conclusion that [the commission] reached or must have reached' 
to support its orders." Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc., Op. No. 27711 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 
filed Apr. 19, 2017) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 16 at 27, 29) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, 
Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981)). 
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LAW/ANAYLSIS  
Foran argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding her injury resulted from an 
idiopathic fall that was not compensable as an "injury by accident arising out of 
and in the course of [her] employment."  § 42-1-160(A).  We agree.  
"Idiopathic falls are excepted from the general rule that a work-related injury is 
compensable.  As an exception to workers' compensation coverage, the idiopathic 
doctrine should be strictly construed."  Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty, 411 S.C. 391, 
395, 768 S.E.2d 651, 653 (2015). "An idiopathic fall is one that is 'brought on by a 
purely personal condition unrelated to the employment, such as heart attack or 
seizure.'" Id. at 395‒96, 798 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting 2 Modern Workers 
Compensation § 110:8).  "The idiopathic fall doctrine is based on the notion that an 
idiopathic injury does not stem from an accident, but is brought on by a condition 
particular to the employee that could have manifested itself anywhere."  Id. at 396, 
768 S.E.2d at 653.
In Crosby v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., Crosby fell while walking through the store on 
her way to a meeting, but she was unable to identify anything on the floor that 
caused her to slip. 330 S.C. 489, 490, 499 S.E.2d 253, 254 (Ct. App. 1998).  As 
Crosby failed to present any evidence of what caused her to fall, our court 
concluded it would be "wholly conjectural to say under the evidence presented that 
Crosby's employment was a contributing cause of her injury."  Id. at 495, 499 
S.E.2d at 256. The court deemed Crosby's fall idiopathic and affirmed the denial 
of benefits, attributing her injury "to an internal breakdown within the claimant's 
body where the claimant failed to present evidence as to the cause of the 
occurrence." Id. at 496, 499 S.E.2d at 257; see also Miller v. Springs Cotton Mills, 
225 S.C. 326, 330, 82 S.E.2d 458, 459 (1954) (finding claimant's knee failed to 
function normally and her near-fall was caused by "some internal failure or 
breakdown in the knee which might have happened at any time" where claimant's 
testimony indicated her feet were flat on the floor and she simply lost balance 
while attempting to rise from a cafeteria chair).
More recently, in Barnes,2 our supreme court clarified the idiopathic exception.  
Barnes, an administrative assistant, stumbled, fell, and sustained serious injuries 
2 Foran's hearing before the single commissioner was held October 31, 2014; the 
single commissioner issued his order on January 14, 2015.  The supreme court 
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while walking to a realtor's office to check e-mail.  She was unable to point to any 
cause of her fall, and there was no irregularity in the office carpeting.  Barnes, 411 
S.C. at 394–95, 768 S.E.2d at 652–53.  Despite the unexplained nature of the fall, 
our supreme court concluded Barnes's injuries were not idiopathic, distinguishing 
Crosby because there was "no evidence [Barnes's] leg gave out or she suffered 
some other internal breakdown or failure." Id. at 397, 768 S.E.2d at 654.3 
In Nicholson, Nicholson was walking to a work meeting when she scuffed her foot 
on a level carpeted surface and fell.  411 S.C. at 383, 769 S.E.2d at 2.  Our 
supreme court concluded, 
Nicholson was at work on the way to a meeting when she 
tripped and fell. The circumstances of her employment 
required her to walk down the hallway to perform her 
responsibilities and in the course of those duties she 
sustained an injury. We hold these facts establish a causal
connection between her employment and her injuries—the 
law requires nothing more.  Because Nicholson's fall 
happened at work and was not caused by a condition 
peculiar to her, it was causally connected to her 
employment. 
Id. at 390, 769 S.E.2d at 5. Similarly, in Barnes, our supreme court found "Barnes 
was performing a work task when she tripped and fell.  Those facts alone clearly 
issued the opinions in Nicholson v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, 
411 S.C. 381, 769 S.E.2d 1 (2015), and Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty, 411 S.C. 391, 
768 S.E.2d 651 (2015), that same day.
3 Here, Store manager Rogers testified Foran told him "she was stocking cigarettes 
and when she went to get up her ankle kind of gave way."  However, unlike the 
Crosby fall, the circumstances of Foran's injury were not unexplained; Foran 
described the uneven mat, and the surveillance video confirmed she was moving 
about and stocking shelves when her injury occurred.  See also Shatto v. McLeod 
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 408 S.C. 595, 600, 759 S.E.2d 443, 445–46 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(affirming award of compensation and concluding fall was not idiopathic where 
claimant "identified specific, non-internal reasons for tripping").
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establish a causal connection between her employment and the injuries she 
sustained." 411 S.C. at 398, 768 S.E.2d at 654.   
After careful review of the record, particularly the surveillance video, we find 
Foran's injury occurred while she was in constant motion—stocking cigarettes, 
rising from one knee while turning around toward the register, and stepping 
forward with her left foot. The video shows Foran in visible pain before both of 
her feet were planted and facing the register.  While we agree with the Appellate 
Panel that the surveillance video was the "key to the compensability of this case," 
we conclude the Appellate Panel's finding that the injury occurred while both of 
Foran's feet were planted on the mat was clearly erroneous.  See Pierre, 386 S.C. at 
540, 689 S.E.2d at 618 ("An appellate court can reverse or modify the [Appellate 
Panel]'s decision if it is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view 
of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record.").  Foran's 
testimony describing her injury is consistent with the store video.   
The medical evidence further supports a finding that Foran's injury was not caused 
without explanation by an "internal failure or breakdown."  Foran's medical 
records following her 2005 surgery indicate the procedure resulted in good tension 
and stability. Further, the Doctor's Care date of injury intake assessment recorded 
Foran's "History of Present Illness" as "[w]as at the bottom shelf of stocking 
cigarettes this AM when she stood up and may have caught on a mat twisting her 
left ankle-since then it is painful to bear weight on it. . . . but since surgery, had 
been pregnant, and working and has had no issues with ankle pain, swelling or 
giving way - until today." Moreover, although store manager Rogers claimed 
Foran walked with a limp, he admitted nothing precluded Foran from performing 
any of her job duties.   
In order to be entitled to workers' compensation benefits, an employee must show 
he or she sustained an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employment." § 42-1-160(A). "'Arising out of' refers to the injury's origin and 
cause, whereas 'in the course of' refers to the injury's time, place, and 
circumstances."  Osteen v. Greenville Cty. Sch. Dist., 333 S.C. 43, 50, 508 S.E.2d 
21, 24 (1998) (citing Howell v. Pac. Columbia Mills, 291 S.C. 469, 471, 354 
S.E.2d 384, 385 (1987)). "The injury arises out of employment when there is a 
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be 
performed and the resulting injury."  Id. at 50, 508 S.E.2d at 25.
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Foran was undeniably performing a work task when she "suffered an injury by 
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment." The Appellate Panel 
committed an error of law in failing to strictly construe the idiopathic exception to 
coverage as Barnes and Nicholson require; thus, we reverse its denial of 
compensation. As noted above, we also find the Commission's decision clearly 
erroneous in view of the substantial evidence in the record.4 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse and remand to the Appellate Panel for a determination of benefits.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
GEATHERS, J., and MOORE, A.J., concur.  
4 We do not address whether the mat constitutes a special hazard. See Nicholson, 
411 S.C. at 389, 769 S.E.2d at 5 (finding this court "erred in requiring claimant to 
prove the existence of a hazard or danger" and "an employee need only prove a 
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be 
performed and the resulting injury").
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LEE, A.J.:  Demario Monte Thompson appeals his convictions and sentences for 
first-degree burglary and third-degree assault and battery, arguing the trial court 
erred by (1) admitting a trespass notice letter into evidence; (2) admitting the entire  
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recording of a 911 call into evidence; (3) denying his motion for a directed verdict 
on the first-degree burglary charge; and (4) denying his motion for a new trial.  We 
affirm.    
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A Lancaster County grand jury indicted Thompson for first-degree burglary and 
attempted murder based on allegations he broke into Keasia Drafton's apartment 
and tried to kill her on July 2, 2014.1  Before trial, Thompson moved to suppress a 
trespass notice letter stating he was banned from the apartment complex where 
Drafton lived. Thompson argued (1) the letter was irrelevant, (2) the letter 
presented impermissible character evidence, and (3) the letter's prejudicial effect
substantially outweighed its probative value.  The State contended because the 
letter proved Thompson did not live in Drafton's apartment, he did not have 
inherent consent to be there.  Further, the State agreed it would not discuss the 
reason Thompson was banned from the apartment during trial.  The trial court 
denied Thompson's motion.  
At trial, Deputy Reuben Silberman testified he responded to a disturbance at an 
apartment complex between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. on July 2, 2014.  He recalled the 
apartment "door appeared to have been kicked in" because "[t]he deadbolt was still 
engaged[,] and the door was hanging slightly off its hinges."  Deputy Silberman 
stated he spoke with Drafton, who was "very upset" and had wounds on her head 
and neck. The State introduced photos taken by Deputy Silberman depicting 
Drafton's wounds and the apartment door.  Deputy Silberman believed the wound 
on Drafton's neck was due to strangulation.  According to Deputy Silberman, 
Drafton answered the door in underwear and a tank top, and her clothes were torn.  
Deputy Silberman believed a physical altercation had occurred in the living room
because "some things were thrown around the apartment."  
Dominique Huff testified he lived in the apartment across from Drafton.  Huff 
recalled he heard "a whole bunch of commotion" coming from Drafton's apartment 
and saw "the door was off the hinges."  He stated he went back inside his 
1 Thompson was also indicted for possession or display of a firearm during a 
violent crime and two counts of pointing and presenting a firearm, but the trial 
court granted a directed verdict on these charges.  
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apartment, but he came out again because "somebody yelled [someone] had a gun."  
He noted that when he came outside a second time, he saw Thompson "down by 
the trash can" arguing with a neighbor.  Huff recalled Thompson raised his hand, 
but he could not tell if Thompson had a gun because it was dark.  Huff indicated 
Drafton was crying and appeared "hysterical." 
Janice Sager, the manager of Drafton's apartment complex, testified Thompson 
was not a resident at the apartment complex, and the State introduced the trespass 
notice letter over Thompson's objection.  Sager explained she drafted the letter 
stating Thompson was banned from the apartment complex at the direction of her 
district manager and Drafton signed it on March 18, 2014.  The letter stated 
Drafton's lease would be terminated if she allowed Thompson into her apartment 
or onto the property, and it noted Thompson would be charged with trespassing.   
During the testimony of Sandra Cauthen, Deputy Director of the Lancaster County 
Public Safety Communications, the State played a recording of a 911 call made by 
someone who identified herself as Drafton.  Cauthen explained calls to 911 were 
automatically recorded, stored on a server for three years, and regularly maintained 
by the technology department.  Cauthen stated she could not say with absolute 
certainty that Drafton was the caller. Thompson objected to the introduction of the 
recording, arguing (1) it was not properly authenticated to show Drafton was the 
caller and (2) it violated his Confrontation Clause rights because it was testimonial 
and Drafton did not testify.  
In the 911 recording, a woman could be heard crying and stating she needed an 
officer. When the dispatcher explained an officer was in route, the woman 
responded, "[Inaudible].  He just kicked my door."  The woman stated she did not 
need an ambulance.  The dispatcher determined the man had a gun.  When asked 
where the gun was, the woman said, "He got it in his hand."  The woman indicated 
the man was pointing the gun at her.  The woman stated the man's name was 
"Demario Thompson."
When the dispatcher asked for her name, the woman answered, "Keasia Drafton."  
The dispatcher said, "Yes, she said he's standing there with a gun in his hand."  The 
caller stated, "He's gone. [Inaudible].  He ran." The dispatcher asked the woman to 
tell her what the man was wearing.  The woman responded, "I don't know.  I was 
asleep and he came kicking my door."  A man could be heard in the background 
asking whether it was "Demario," and the woman replied, "Yes." The man asked 
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which way he ran, and the woman said, "I don't know.  He pointed it at the lady 
downstairs and then he ran." When asked what the man pointed, the woman stated 
he pointed a gun. When asked if the man hurt her, the woman responded, "Yes he 
kept pointing at —" before the recording cut off. 
Suzanne Collins testified she was the dispatcher who answered the 911 call and 
indicated the recording accurately depicted the entirety of the call. Collins testified 
dispatchers rely on information a caller gives—such as the caller's identity— 
because dispatchers are unable to independently verify the information.   
At the close of the State's case, Thompson moved for a directed verdict on the first-
degree burglary charge, arguing the State did not present sufficient evidence to 
show (1) he did not have consent to enter Drafton's apartment and (2) he intended 
to commit a crime while inside. The trial court denied the motion, finding the 
record contained sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury.  Thompson did 
not present any evidence at trial.  The jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree 
burglary and third-degree assault and battery. After the verdict, Thompson moved 
for a new trial, and the trial court denied his motion.  The trial court sentenced 
Thompson to fifteen years' imprisonment for first-degree burglary and time served 
for third-degree assault and battery.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, an appellate court sits to review only errors of law, and it is 
bound by the trial court's factual findings unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous." State v. Spears, 403 S.C. 247, 252, 742 S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Trespass Letter 
Thompson asserts the trial court erred in admitting the trespass notice letter 
because the letter was irrelevant, impermissible hearsay evidence, impermissible 
character evidence, and unfairly prejudicial.  We disagree.  
"The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not 
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."  State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 
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 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of 
the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."  
Id.  This court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding a Rule 403 
objection absent an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.  State v. Gray, 408 
S.C. 601, 608, 759 S.E.2d 160, 164 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 
A. Relevance 
 
Thompson argues the letter was not relevant because (1) he needed the tenant's 
consent to enter the apartment, not the landlord's consent; (2) the State presented 
no evidence he was aware of the letter; and (3) the letter was signed four months 
before the incident giving rise to his charges.  We disagree.  
 
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."  Rule 402, SCRE.  "Evidence is 
relevant if it tends to establish or make more or less probable some matter in issue 
upon which it directly or indirectly bears."  State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 380, 
401 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1991). 
 
We find the letter was relevant to the element of consent in first-degree burglary.  
See State v. Cross, 323 S.C. 41, 43, 448 S.E.2d 569, 570 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("First[-]degree burglary requires the entry of a dwelling without consent with the 
intent to commit a crime therein, as well as the existence of an aggravating 
circumstance.").  The letter shows Thompson was not a resident of the apartment 
complex.  Therefore, Thompson would not have a possessory interest in Drafton's 
apartment or inherent consent to be there, requiring him to receive Drafton's 
consent before entering the apartment.  Accordingly, we find the letter was 
relevant to an element of first-degree burglary in Thompson's case. 
 
B. Hearsay 
 
Thompson asserts the letter was impermissible hearsay because it was offered to 
prove the fact that Drafton, the declarant, did not consent to Thompson entering 
her apartment.  We disagree.  
 
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. Rule 801(c), SCRE.  Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception 
or an exclusion applies.  Rule 802, SCRE.  One such exception is the business 
records exception, which states: 
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A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in 
any form, of acts, events, conditions, or diagnoses, made 
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted 
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the 
regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as 
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness . . . . 
Rule 803(6), SCRE. 
We find the letter was not impermissible hearsay because it fell under the business 
records exception. Although Thompson argues the letter was a statement made by 
Drafton, we disagree and find Sager was the declarant.  At trial, Sager testified she 
drafted the trespass notice letter at the request of her district manager to inform 
Drafton that Thompson was banned from the apartment complex.  The letter was 
drafted by Sager in her capacity of manager of the apartment complex on the 
apartment's letterhead, and she authenticated it during her testimony at trial.  
Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the letter
was a business record. 
C. Prior Bad Act 
Thompson argues the letter was impermissible character evidence because it 
indicated he committed a prior bad act to justify banning him from the apartment 
complex.  We disagree. 
"Character evidence is not admissible to prove the accused possesses a criminal 
character or has a propensity to commit the crime with which he is charged."  State 
v. Brown, 344 S.C. 70, 73, 543 S.E.2d 552, 554 (2001).  "Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith."  Rule 404(b), SCRE. "It may, however, be 
admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, 
the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."  Id.  "In addition, the 'bad act' must 
logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been charged.  If the 
defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must 
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be clear and convincing."  State v. Beck, 342 S.C. 129, 135, 536 S.E.2d 679, 
682-83 (2000). "Once bad act evidence is found admissible under Rule 404(b), the 
trial court must then conduct the prejudice analysis required by Rule 403, SCRE."  
Spears, 403 S.C. at 253, 742 S.E.2d at 881 (emphasis added by court) (quoting 
State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 435, 683 S.E.2d 275, 278 (2009)).
We find the letter did not constitute improper character evidence.  A person could 
be banned from an apartment for many reasons that do not include committing a 
prior bad act. Although the letter mentioned Thompson was banned from the 
apartment complex by the Lancaster County Sheriff's Department, it specified it 
was at the direction and "on behalf of" the apartment complex. Furthermore, Sager 
did not testify as to why Thompson was banned from the apartment complex.  We 
therefore find the trial court did not err in ruling the letter was not evidence of a 
prior bad act. 
D. Unfair Prejudice 
Thompson contends the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the 
letter's probative value because it would mislead the jury into wrongfully
concluding (1) he did not have consent to enter the apartment and (2) he had an 
intent to commit a crime inside the apartment.  We disagree. 
A trial court may exclude relevant evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs its probative value.  Rule 403, SCRE. Probative value 
means "the measure of the importance of that tendency to [prove or disprove] the 
outcome of a case. It is the weight that a piece of relevant evidence will carry in 
helping the trier of fact decide the issues." Gray, 408 S.C. at 610, 759 S.E.2d at 
165. "Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis."  State v. Wiles, 383 S.C. 151, 158, 679 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2009).  
"A trial court's decision regarding the comparative probative value versus 
prejudicial effect of evidence should be reversed only in exceptional 
circumstances."  State v. Grace, 350 S.C. 19, 28, 564 S.E.2d 331, 335 (Ct. App. 
2002). 
We find the trial court did not err in ruling the potential prejudice for the letter did 
not substantially outweigh its probative value.  The relevancy of the letter to the 
element of consent outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have had.  Although 
the letter may have invited speculation by the jury because it did not specify why 
27 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Thompson was banned from the apartment complex, we find the danger of unfair 
prejudice from such speculation was slight compared to the relevancy of the letter.  
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's admission of the letter.  
II. 911 Recording 
Thompson argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 recording into evidence 
because it was not properly authenticated and violated his confrontation clause 
rights. We disagree.  
First, we disagree with Thompson's argument the State was required to present 
testimony of a witness identifying the caller's voice as belonging to Drafton in 
order to properly authenticate the 911 recording.  Rule 901(a) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Evidence requires authentication "as a condition precedent to 
admissibility . . . by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims."  For this purpose, the rule provides a list of 
ten examples illustrating how a party can properly authenticate evidence.  See Rule 
901(b), SCRE. However, Rule 901 explicitly states the examples listed in 
subsection b are "by way of illustration only" and are not intended to be an 
exhaustive list of the ways to properly authenticate evidence. The rule provides a 
voice may be identified "by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time 
under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker."  Rule 901(b)(5), 
SCRE. Furthermore, telephone conversations with an individual can be 
authenticated "by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time 
by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if . . . circumstances, 
including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called."  
Rule 901(b)(6), SCRE. 
Authentication of a 911 caller's identity can be accomplished by combining the 
caller's self-identification with circumstances surrounding the call.  Here, the 
testimony of Cauthen and Collins coupled with the fact that the information the 
caller gave the dispatcher was confirmed by police when they arrived at the scene 
proved the recording was reliable, satisfying the purpose of the authentication 
requirement. Cauthen explained calls to 911 were automatically recorded, stored 
on a server for three years, and maintained by the technology department.  Collins, 
the dispatcher who spoke with Drafton, testified the recording played at trial was 
an accurate representation of the 911 call.  The caller identified herself as Drafton 
and informed the dispatcher she needed an officer because Thompson "came 
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kicking [at her] door" while she was asleep and pointed a gun at her.  Deputy 
Silberman indicated he spoke with Drafton after arriving at the scene and her 
apartment "door appeared to have been kicked in" because "[t]he deadbolt was still 
engaged and the door was hanging slightly off its hinges."  The evidence presented 
at trial sufficiently establishes the 911 call was what it purported to be— an 
emergency call made by Drafton.      
Furthermore, courts in other jurisdictions have also held a witness is not required 
to identify a caller's voice when the circumstances surrounding the call indicate the 
information given by the caller is accurate.  See United States v. Espinoza, 641 
F.2d 153, 170 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding the testimony of a telephone conversation 
was admissible "even though the witness cannot certainly identify the person with 
whom he spoke by voice identification, [when] the identity of the person . . . [was] 
established by circumstantial evidence"); Rodriguez-Nova v. State, 763 S.E.2d 698, 
701 (Ga. 2014) ("[A]n audio recording can be authenticated by the testimony of 
one party to the recorded conversation."); Young v. State, 696 N.E.2d 386, 389 
(Ind. 1998) ("A caller's identity can be established by circumstantial evidence, and 
need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."); Johnson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 
746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) ("A recording is not admissible unless the voices 
contained thereon are identified. . . .  However, circumstantial evidence may be 
utilized for identification purposes."); State v. C.D.L., 250 P.3d 69, 78 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2011) ("Authentication of a telephone caller's identity can be accomplished 
by combining that caller's self-identification during the call with circumstances 
surrounding the call."); State v. Williams, 150 P.3d 111, 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2007) ("A sound recording, in particular, need not be authenticated by a witness 
with personal knowledge of the events recorded.  Rather, the trial court may 
consider any information sufficient to support the prima facie showing that the 
evidence is authentic.").  
Next, we disagree with Thompson's contention the 911 call contained testimonial 
statements that violated his Confrontation Clause rights.  The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." U.S. Const. amend VI.  In Crawford v. Washington, the United 
States Supreme Court held the admission of testimonial hearsay statements against 
an accused violates the Confrontation Clause if (1) the declarant is unavailable to 
testify at trial and (2) the accused has no prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  The Supreme Court explained the difference 
between nontestimonial and testimonial statements in Davis v. Washington: 
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 Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 
We find this case to be more like Davis than Crawford and the recording did not 
violate Thompson's Confrontation Clause rights.  Although Drafton did not testify 
at trial, her statements on the 911 call were made to obtain police assistance, and 
the questions during the call were to elicit more information to enable police to 
assist her. For the first ninety seconds of the recording, the dispatcher asked 
Drafton questions about present events, such as if Thompson was pointing the gun 
at her and if she needed an ambulance.  See id. at 827 (considering whether an 
interviewee "was speaking about events as they were actually happening" to 
determine if a 911 call was testimonial).  During the call, Drafton informed the 
dispatcher Thompson kicked in her door while she was asleep and pointed a gun at 
her and a neighbor. Furthermore, Drafton was upset, breathing hard, and trying to 
calm down throughout the call. Although the dispatcher and a man at the scene 
asked five questions after Drafton informed them Thompson was no longer at her 
apartment, the questions were necessary to gather information to assist officers in 
determining where the perpetrator went and if Drafton needed medical attention.  
See id. (considering whether the interrogator asked questions that "elicited 
statements [that] were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency" when 
determining if a 911 call was testimonial).   
 
III. Directed Verdict 
 
Thompson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed 
verdict, claiming the State failed to prove he gained entry to Drafton's apartment, 
intended to commit a crime once inside the apartment, or caused injuries to 
Drafton. We disagree. 
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"An appellate court reviews the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the State." State v. Gilliland, 402 S.C. 389, 397, 741 S.E.2d 521, 525 
(Ct. App. 2012). "When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is 
concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."  State v. 
Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  "Accordingly, in ruling 
on a directed verdict motion [when] the State relies on circumstantial evidence, the 
court must determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient to allow a 
reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Pearson, 415 S.C. 463, 473, 783 S.E.2d 802, 807-08 (2016) (quoting State v. 
Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 237, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016)).  "'[W]hen the
[circumstantial] evidence presented merely raises a suspicion of guilt,' the trial 
court should direct a verdict in favor of the accused."  Gilliland, 402 S.C. at 397, 
741 S.E.2d at 525 (second alteration by court) (quoting State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 
134, 142, 708 S.E.2d 774, 778 (2011)).  "A mere suspicion is a belief that is 
inspired by 'facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof.'" Id. at 397, 741 
S.E.2d at 526 (quoting State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 
(2001)). 
"First[-]degree burglary requires the entry of a dwelling without consent with the 
intent to commit a crime therein, as well as the existence of an aggravating 
circumstance." Cross, 323 S.C. at 43, 448 S.E.2d at 570.  "'Enters a building 
without consent' means: (a) [t]o enter a building without the consent of the person 
in lawful possession; or (b) [t]o enter a building by using deception, artifice, trick, 
or misrepresentation to gain consent to enter from the person in lawful possession."  
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-310 (2015). 
Here, the evidence presented by the State warranted submission of the case to the 
jury. The State presented substantial circumstantial evidence tending to prove 
Thompson entered Drafton's apartment without consent and with the intent to 
commit a crime.  The trespass notice letter coupled with the circumstances of 
Thompson's entry show he did not have Drafton's consent to enter the apartment.  
The 911 call provides further evidence of whether Drafton consented to Thompson 
entering the apartment, as Drafton was audibly upset during the call and indicated 
Thompson kicked in her apartment door while she was sleeping.  Furthermore, 
Thompson's intent to commit a crime can be inferred by the circumstances of his 
entry coupled with Drafton's injuries.  See State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 
185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971) ("Intent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct 
31 

   
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
evidence and must ordinarily be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is, by facts 
and circumstances from which intent may be inferred.").  Deputy Silberman and 
Huff both testified Drafton's apartment door had been kicked in and was hanging 
off the hinges. Deputy Silberman testified Drafton had injuries to her head and 
neck, and it appeared she had been strangled.  The photographs admitted into 
evidence further show Drafton's injuries on her face and neck. Finally, evidence 
suggested Thompson gained entry into Drafton's apartment after kicking in the 
door. Huff testified he heard a commotion coming from Drafton's apartment, and 
Deputy Silberman recalled it looked like a struggle occurred inside the apartment 
because Drafton's belongings were thrown around.  Moreover, Drafton indicated in 
the 911 recording Thompson kicked down her door while she was asleep and 
pointed a gun at her. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's denial of 
Thompson's motion for a directed verdict.  
IV. New Trial 
Last, Thompson asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, 
when the cumulative effect of the errors was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a 
fair trial. We find no merit to the argument, as we find no error on the part of the 
trial court. 
"Generally, the grant or refusal of a new trial is within the trial [court]'s discretion 
and will not be disturbed on appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion."  State 
v. Garrett, 350 S.C. 613, 619, 567 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Ct. App. 2002).  "Whe[n] there 
is competent evidence to sustain a jury's verdict, the trial [court] may not substitute 
[its] judgment for that of the jury and overturn that verdict." State v. Miller, 287 
S.C. 280, 283, 337 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1985).  "The cumulative error doctrine 
provides relief to a party when a combination of errors, insignificant by 
themselves, has the effect of preventing the party from receiving a fair trial, and 
the cumulative effect of the errors affects the outcome of the trial."  State v. 
Beekman, 405 S.C. 225, 237, 746 S.E.2d 483, 490 (Ct. App. 2013), aff'd, 415 S.C. 
632, 785 S.E.2d 202 (2016). "An appellant must demonstrate more than error in 
order to qualify for reversal pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine; rather, he 
must show the errors adversely affected his right to a fair trial to qualify for 
reversal on this ground." Id.
Because we have found no errors in regard to the other issues Thompson raised on 
appeal and Thompson does not point to any other errors made by the trial court, 
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this issue is without merit.  See State v. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. 281, 290, 350 S.E.2d 
180, 186 (1986) (holding when an appellate court found no errors, appellant's
assertion the trial court should have granted a new trial because of the cumulative 
effect of the asserted trial errors had no merit). 
CONCLUSION 
We reject Thompson's various challenges to his convictions of first-degree 
burglary and third-degree assault and battery.  We find the trial court properly 
admitted the trespass notice letter and 911 recording.  We further hold the State 
presented sufficient evidence Thompson broke into Drafton's apartment without 
her consent and with the intent to injure her to survive his motion for a directed 
verdict on the first-degree burglary charge.  Finally, we find the trial court properly 
denied Thompson's motion for a new trial.  Accordingly, the decision of the trial 
court is 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
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HILL, J.: Toni Lynn Tillman brought this ejectment action against her brother, 
Timothy Troy Tillman (Appellant), and his wife, for failing to pay rent since 2011.  
Appellant counterclaimed, alleging numerous causes of action. 
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The trial court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss several of Appellant's
counterclaims. Appellant, who had orally moved to amend his pleadings at the 
motion to dismiss hearing, asked the court to reconsider. The trial court denied the 
motion to reconsider, but in its order wrote: 
The Court takes this opportunity to clarify its order 
dismissing the defendants' counterclaims. The oral motion 
to amend counterclaims was denied but the defendants 
may make a formal motion to amend their counterclaims.   
This appeal followed, with Appellant contending the trial court erred in dismissing 
his counterclaims and in "denying" his motion for leave to amend.   
Around ten days after filing this appeal, Appellant filed a motion to amend in the 
trial court, averring the trial court order had given him "leave to file" an amended 
pleading. 
The threshold question is whether the order is immediately appealable. The granting 
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is immediately appealable. Williams v. Condon, 
347 S.C. 227, 233, 553 S.E.2d 496, 500 (Ct. App. 2001). But the issue of whether
an order that grants a 12(b)(6) motion yet simultaneously grants leave to amend the 
pleadings is immediately appealable does not seem to have arisen since adoption of 
the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR) and South Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure (SCRCP). 
Generally only final judgments are appealable. Doe v. Howe, 362 S.C. 212, 216, 
607 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Ct. App. 2004) ("'Final judgment' is a term of art referring to 
the disposition of all the issues in the case."). A final judgment is one that ends the 
action and leaves the court with nothing to do but enforce the judgment by execution.  
Good v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 201 S.C. 32, 41–42, 21 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1942).  
An order reserving an issue, or leaving open the possibility of further action by the 
trial court before the rights of the parties are resolved, is interlocutory. Ex parte 
Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 12, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005).
Some exceptions to the final judgment rule are set forth in section 14-3-330 of the 
South Carolina Code (2017), which provides for the appealability of certain 
interlocutory orders. Subsection (1) allows for the immediate appeal of orders 
"involving the merits." An order involves the merits when it "finally determine[s] 
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some substantial matter forming the whole or a part of some cause of action or 
defense . . . ." Mid-State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 
334, 426 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1993) (citation omitted). The fate of Appellant's 
counterclaims has not been finally determined as long as his motion to amend hangs 
in the balance. 
We next consider section 14-3-330(2), specifically whether the trial court's order 
affects Appellant's "substantial right" and "strikes out" a pleading. Our courts have 
held that orders denying a motion to amend an answer, Baldwin Const. Co. v. 
Graham, 357 S.C. 227, 229–30, 593 S.E.2d 146, 147 (2004), denying a motion to 
file a late answer, Jefferson by Johnson v. Gene's Used Cars, Inc., 295 S.C. 317, 
317–18, 368 S.E.2d 456, 456 (1988), and denying a motion to amend to file a third 
party complaint, Tatnall v. Gardner, 350 S.C. 135, 138, 564 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct.
App. 2002), are not immediately appealable, primarily because they may be
appealed after the case has ended and final judgment entered. However, our supreme 
court has used the same section to find the granting of a motion to dismiss may be 
immediately appealed because it "strikes" a pleading. Lebovitz v. Mudd, 289 S.C. 
476, 479, 347 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1986). We are presented with a hybrid: an order that 
"strikes" a counterclaim, but welcomes a formal motion to amend.
Cureton v. Hutchinson, 3 S.C. 606 (1872) found a similar order was not immediately 
appealable. The advent of modern rules of civil and appellate procedure and 
intervening changes to section 14-3-330 have not dulled the reasoning of Cureton, 
which dismissed as interlocutory an order sustaining a demurrer but granting  
plaintiff leave to amend:  
The effect of the order appealed from was to give the 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. If it was 
not in his power to make an amendment that would obviate 
the objection ruled against him, or if he elected to rest his
whole case on the sufficiency of his complaint, then the
proper course of practice was, after sufficient time allowed 
for amendment had elapsed, for final judgment to have 
been entered, and from that judgment the plaintiff could 
have appealed. . . . From all that appears before us, the 
right to amend is still in force, and may be exercised in the 
Circuit Court, after judgment rendered in this Court. In 
such an event, it might prove, in the end, that the question 
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submitted to us, at this time, was of no material value to 
the controversy. The right of an amendment must be cut 
off by a judgment before the case is ripe for this Court. 
Id. at 607–08. If anything has changed since Cureton, it is the ease with which
pleadings may now be amended; after all, the rules require that leave be "freely
given." Rule 15(a), SCRCP. In the unlikely event the motion to amend is denied, 
then Appellant retains the right, after the lawsuit ends, to appeal the denial along 
with the dismissal of his counterclaims. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (allowing 
party to defer appeal of an interlocutory order "necessarily affecting the judgment"
until final judgment); Link v. Sch. Dist. of Pickens Cty., 302 S.C. 1, 6, 393 S.E.2d 
176, 179 (1990). 
Many federal circuits have held that orders dismissing a party's pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12, but with leave to amend, are not appealable final judgments within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See e.g., Sapp v. City of Brooklyn Park, 825 F.3d 931, 
934 (8th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases); Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 
F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Jung v. K. & D. Mining Co., 356 U.S. 335, 
336–37 (1958).
To avoid circuitous litigation and needless appeals, we construe section 14-3-330 
narrowly, eyeing the nature and effect of the order, not merely its label. Morrow v.
Fundamental Long-Term Care Holdings, LLC, 412 S.C. 534, 538, 773 S.E.2d 144, 
146 (2015); Thornton v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Corp., 391 S.C. 297, 302–04, 705 S.E.2d 
475, 478–79 (Ct. App. 2011). If we were to hold otherwise and interpret the order 
as denying amendment, we would be left with the clumsy result of allowing appeal 
of the motion to dismiss to proceed, but dismissing the appeal of the denial of the 
motion to amend. While we can review an interlocutory order joined with an
appealable issue, Ferguson v. Charleston Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 349 S.C. 558, 565, 
564 S.E.2d 94, 98 (2002), to do so here would work a false efficiency, given the
lawsuit from which the appeal was spun off remains to be heard in circuit court, 
along with Appellant's formal motion to amend.1 
1 We are not persuaded by Appellant's statement in his brief that the appeal was
necessary because the motion to amend could not be heard in circuit court before
trial. There may be a strategy motivating the appeal other than tactical delay, but we 
cannot think of a rational one. 
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Appellant's rights have yet to be finally determined by the circuit court. Appellant 
has not reached the end of the road, however long and winding he may have made 
it. The order is not immediately appealable.  Consequently, the appeal is
DISMISSED.2
	
GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 

2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
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